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A tale of leverage and hubris

As the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008
fades into history, most people
have remained confused about
the causes of
this economic
tsunami. Since
the nature of the
train wreck goes a
long way towards
explaining the
present stagnaJohn H.
tion of the U.S.
Brown
economy, this is
unfortunate.
A large part of the confusion
lies in the partisan wrangling
about the roots of the crisis.
Bethany McClean and Joe
Nocera have written the most
balanced and comprehensive
account of the evolution of this
cataclysm.
The starting point is the idea
of ﬁnancial leverage, simple
in concept, if often complex in
implementation.
In ﬁnance you use leverage
by purchasing an asset with
borrowed funds. The advantage is more of the asset can be
purchased and any gains in the
asset’s value go to the buyer.
The danger is that the borrower
won’t be able to repay the debt.

This credit risk is at the core
of all lending decisions. Lenders
protect themselves from credit
risk in three ways.
First, they try to only lend
to borrowers who will repay
the loan. (credit evaluation)
However, even the most careful
lender will make mistakes, so
lenders backstop themselves
with two added protections.
The try not to lend too much to
any one borrower (diversiﬁcation), and they don’t commit
every possible dollar to lending.
(capital reserves)
Each of these has a role in the
story of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Let us start with capital
reserves. Lenders know they
need to maintain the safety
margins capital reserves represent. However, the reserves
do not earn anything, so there
is a continuing pressure to use
capital reserves.
One of the lessons of the Great
Depression was that lenders
tempted by proﬁts do not keep
adequate capital. So, since
the 1930s lenders have been
required by law to maintain certain minimum levels of reserves.
This results in continual gaming

of the legal capital requirements.
One method of reducing
required capital is to demonstrate the risks of your lending
are low. If your loans as a group
are mostly unrelated, then
diversiﬁcation means you are
less at risk than a lender with an
equal amount of money loaned
to very similar borrowers.
Traditional mortgage lenders
usually made their loans to
borrowers in a single geographic
area where an unfortunate event
(say a plant closing) could cause
lots of defaults. By bundling
mortgages from many areas in
the country, diversiﬁcation was
achieved and risks lowered.
However, something important was lost.
Local lenders had both the
ability and the incentive to
judge the creditworthiness of
borrowers. When loans began
to be made on a national basis,
both of these were lost. There
was a replacement available in
the form of the national credit
rating agencies. However, their
incentives were thoroughly perverted by the gusher of money
unleashed by mortgage securitization.

Beyond this, practices were
embraced in the name of diversiﬁcation that had no relationship to actually reducing the
risks of lending. In particular,
the process of creating new
securities by bundling poor
credit risks from several distinct
sources resulted in increased
risks since these securities were
even more likely to default.
In effect, all of the traditional
protections against bad lending were forfeited in the rush
to exploit the phony diversiﬁcation of securitization. McClean
and Nocera lay this all out in
painstaking detail. They also
do so without the partisan axe
grinding that characterizes so
much that has been written on
this subject.
It’s highly recommended
reading.
Dr. John H. Brown is an associate
professor in the School of Economic
Development at Georgia Southern
University. Dr. Brown can be reached
at jbrown@georgiasouthern.edu.
“All the Devils are Here: The Hidden
History of the Financial Crisis,” by
Bethany McClean and Joe Nocera.
2010, Penguin Books, New York.

Parker honored
as ‘innovator’
Business in savannah

Parker’s convenience stores’ techsavvy approach to its business has led
a food service industry trade publication
to name the company’s president and
CEO, Greg Parker,
as convenience store
“Innovator of the
Year” for the southeast region.
Parker
The Gr if f in
Report of Food Marketing picked
the Savannah businessman because
of his “unique take on operating
practices such as product selection,
inventory and management,” according to spokesman Mike Berger.
A feature on Parker will appear in
a future issue of the publication.
Another trade publication, Convenience Store Petroleum, or CSP
for short, proﬁled Parker recently,
dubbing him the “Proﬁt Prophet.”
The piece examines how his 21 area
convenience stores consistently rank
among the nation’s most proﬁtable
according to National Association
of Convenience Stores data.
“We’re doing a lot of new stuff,
and I’m honored by the recognition,” Parker said. “We really are
innovative. We’re doing things that
nobody else is doing.”
Adam Van Brimmer
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